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This paper uses individual level data to analyze the effect of changes in the
compulsorybenefitpackageoftheGermanstatutoryhealthinsurancescheme
on the demand for private supplementary insurance. In particular, we aim at
measuringtheeffectofexcludingdenturesfromthebenefitpackagein1997as
wellastheeffectofre-includingthemin1999.Adifference-in-differencesesti-
mator is used. Individuals born prior to 1979 serve as control group because
onlytheyoungwereaffectedbythereform.Ourresultsdonotexhibitanysig-
nificant effects on the demand for supplementary health insurance. Thus, the
hypothesis that clients do make informed choices about their health insuran-
ces’ coverage is not supported.
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In Germany, the statutory health insurance scheme covers all regularly employed
people whose salaries do not exceed a certain income ceiling.1 Though clients are
free to choose from hundreds of different providers of statutory health insurance,
the beneﬁt package is largely standardized by law. In the political debate, this stan-
dardized package is often criticized to be rather generously deﬁned, covering ben-
eﬁts that go far beyond primary health care, e.g. treatment at health resorts. Never-
theless, the insured may amend the beneﬁt package by contracting supplementary2
private insurance, yet it is not possible to reduce the beneﬁt package3 in order to
reduce insurance premiums.
Economists often argue that allowing for greater choice with respect to the ben-
eﬁt package covered by health insurance will increase welfare since preferences are
likely to vary across individuals. Yet, the counterargument to this is that individu-
als typically are not able to appraise what kind of medical treatment they may need
in the future and, therefore are unlikely to make informed individual choices about
the beneﬁt package. Letting medical experts deﬁne a rather broad package may
therefore be in the best interest of those that are insured under the statutory health
insurance scheme. Moreover, letting clients decide about their insurance coverage
may result in a severe problem of adverse selection, i.e. ﬁrst and foremost bad risks
are likely seek for insurance.
This paper contributes to this discussion by analyzing the effects of a change in
1Currently the income ceiling is 48150 e per year.
2According to the deﬁnition by THOMSON &M OSSIALOS (2004) this represents “complemen-
tary” rather than “supplementary” insurance. Nevertheless, we stick to the term “supplementary”
that is typically used in the context of the German health insurance system.
3With respect to a very limited set of beneﬁts, providers of statutory health insurance are free
to include them into the beneﬁt package or not. Thus, switching the provider represents the only
option for marginally changing the beneﬁt package of the statutory insurance.
4the standard beneﬁt package on the demand for private supplementary health in-
surance. In particular, we look at the year 1997 when dentures – including partial
ones like dental crowns and dental bridges – were excluded from the compulsory
health insurance package. Yet, for political reasons, two years later these beneﬁts
were re-included again. If individuals do make informed choices about the size of
their insurance coverage and individuals’ preferences are in fact heterogeneous the
demand for supplementary dental insurance should increase if such services are
no longer covered by the compulsory health insurance scheme. The reverse should
happen if such beneﬁts are (re)included into the compulsory health insurance pack-
age.
The reform of 1997 and its abolishment in 1999 is particularly well suited for
measuring the effects of changes in the compulsory beneﬁt package. In contrast to
many other reforms, the reduction in beneﬁts did only apply to a well deﬁned sub-
group of individuals. For those born in 1978 and earlier years dentures remained
in the beneﬁt package. In contrast, individuals born after 1978 were affected by
the reform. Therefore, the latter represent a treatment group while the former may
serve as control group. For the identiﬁcation of treatment effects we can apply
a difference-in-differences approach that allows separating pure treatment effects
form effects other unobservable factors may have had on the demand for supple-
mentary private insurance.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the legal
environment and refers to the existing literature, section 3 introduces the data ma-
terial, section 4 discusses the econometric approach, section 5 reports the empirical
results, and section 6 concludes.
52 Regulatory Framework and Literature Review
In 1975 dentures were included into the beneﬁt package of the German statutory
health insurance. At this time the insured did not have to make any co-payments.
Already two years later a co-payment of 20% of total cost was introduced. In 1982
the co-payment was extended to 40% and in 1989 it was further increased for those
who could not verify routine dental checkups in the previous years. In 1997 for
insured born later than 1978 dentures were completely excluded from the bene-
ﬁt package except for the case of accidental dental injuries. For insured born in
1978 and earlier years dentures remained part of the beneﬁt package, yet the co-
payments were marginally increased by ﬁve percentage-points.4
In 1998 the system of co-payments was changed again. Instead of covering the
cost of dentures on a pro-rata basis the statutory health insurance granted certain
ﬁxed allowances to insured – born in 1978 and before – undergoing dental treat-
ment. This allowance did not directly depend on total cost of dental treatment but
on the severeness of dental health problems.5
In 1999, however, the reform of 1997 and 1998 was completely abolished. That
is dentures, once again, became part of the beneﬁt package, irrespective of age and
the former system of pro-rata co-payments was re-introduced.6 Moreover, clients
without coverage of dentures in 1997 and 1998 were granted the right to immedi-
ately cancel any private supplementary insurance covering such dental treatment
they might have contracted in between.
4Therelevantbillis“GesetzzurEntlastungderBeitr¨ ageindergesetzlichenKrankenversicherung
(Beitragsentlastungsgesetz – BeitrEntlG)”, 1996 BGBl. I S. 1631.
5The relevant bill is “Zweites Gesetz zur Neuordnung von Selbstverwaltung und Eigenverant-
wortung in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (2. GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz – 2. NOG)”, 1997
BGBl. I S. 1520.
6The relevant bill is “Gesetz zur St¨ arkung der Solidarit¨ at in der gesetzlichen Krankenver-
sicherung (GKV-Solidarit¨ atsst¨ arkungsgesetz – GKV-SolG)”, 1998 BGBl. I S. 3853.
6In the following years, dentures became subject to further reforms. In 2005 pro-
rata co-payments were once again replaced by ﬁxed allowances. In the same year a
new funding scheme for covering the cost of dentures was introduced.7 However,
insurance for dentures is still compulsory.
Our analysis focusses on the exclusion of dentures from the beneﬁt package in
1997 for clients born later than 1978 and on the cancelation of this reform in 1999.
We consider those born after 1978 as treatment group an those born in 1978 and be-
fore as control group. As pointed out the control group did not remain completely
unaffected by the reforms. In 1997 and 1998 the co-payment for this group was
somewhat higher than in the periods before and after. Yet, the impact of the reform
on the older clients compared to those born after 1978 seems to be rather small. Our
estimated treatment effect at worst might be biased towards zero for this reason.
The issue of excluding dentures from the beneﬁt package of statutory health in-
surance has already been addressed by earlier work. Yet, the relevant literature
dealing with the German case is purely descriptive, e.g. PKV (2001), or policy ori-
ented, e.g. KERN (2003) and WAGNER (2003). Analyses addressing causal effects of
cutbacks in beneﬁt package on the demand for supplementary private insurance in
Germany seem to be absent from the literature. For the Dutch case the exclusion of
dental services from the beneﬁt package of statutory health insurance has been ana-
lyzed by GODFRIED ET AL. (2001). This analysis identiﬁes an enormous post-reform
demand for supplementary insurance. Yet, for institutional reasons the Dutch re-
form of 1995 is hardly comparable to its German counterpart. Moreover, in contrast
to our analysis GODFRIED ET AL. (2001) focus on the issue of adverse selection.
7Employers do not have to pay 50% of the health insurance premium anymore as long as den-
tures are concerned. The insured has to bear the entire premium.
73 The Data
We use data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for analyzing the ef-
fects of changes in the compulsory beneﬁt package on the demand for private sup-
plementary insurance, cf. HAISKEN-DENEW &F RICK (2005).8 We focus on indi-
viduals covered by statutory health insurance and exclude individuals with com-
prehensive private insurance, which is typically the case for self-employed and civil
servants. We consider the waves 1995 trough 2000, i.e. two years prior to the reform
in 1997, two years when the reform was in effect, and two years after the reform
was abolished. We exclude those individuals that are not insured themselves, but
covered by the insurance of a family member9, because for the years 1997 and 1998
the GSOEP does not contain information about supplementary health insurance for
these individuals.
The treatment group exclusively consists of very young individuals. In order
to avoid comparing completely different age groups that might exhibit quite dif-
ferent demand patterns for insurances we restrict the control group to individuals
younger than 25 years of age.10 For the early waves, especially 1995, the treatment
group is very small. For the GSOEP only individuals are interviewed when they
reach the minimum age of 16. Typically interviews take place in the ﬁrst third of
the year. Therefore, only a limited number of individuals born in 1979 had already
reached the age of 16 when the interviews in 1995 took place. Moreover, most of
8The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v1.0 (Oct
2006) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The
following authors supplied PanelWhiz SOEP Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency, John
P. Haisken-DeNew (4), Markus Hahn and John P. Haisken-DeNew (10). The PanelWhiz generated
DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon request.
Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own. HAISKEN-DENEW &H AHN (2006)
describes PanelWhiz in detail.
9This typically applies to children and spouses who are not employed.
10We tried several different values for the maximum age. Yet, in qualitative terms the results
remained largely unchanged.
8Table 1: Supplementary Private Insurance
Year Treatment Control All
share # of obs. share # of obs. share # of obs.
1995 0.000 0.3 0.023 1347 0.023 1347
1996 0.110 43 0.018 1035 0.022 1078
1997 0.014 131 0.019 1020 0.018 1151
1998 0.053 256 0.028 796 0.034 1053
1999 0.059 396 0.086 685 0.076 1080
2000 0.061 539 0.060 543 0.061 1082
∑ – 1365 – 5426 – 6791
Notes: Individuals aged 16 to 24 years. Weighted by inverse sampling probability.
them are likely to be covered by parents’ insurance. Hence, analyzing the reform
of 1997 separately from its abolishment in 1999 is not possible because of the small
size of the treatment group.
In the empirical analysis the binary indicator “supplementary private insurance”
serves as dependent variable. Unfortunately, prior to 1999 the data contain no infor-
mation about whether dentures are covered by supplementary private insurance.
So we cannot focus on the demand for supplementary dental insurance alone. For
the years 1999 and 2000 about 54% of supplementary private insurances cover den-
tures in the considered age group.
Table 1 displays the share of individuals holding supplementary insurance along
with the number of observations by sample years for both the treatment and the
control group. All values are weighted by the inverse sampling probability. In
total, the sample comprises 6791 observations (2184 individuals) with valid infor-
mation about the dependent variable. The size of the treatment group increases as
the cohorts born since 1979 pass the age of 16 and leave co-insurance with their
parents. The total share of individuals with supplementary private insurance is
9clearly growing over time, most obviously from 1998 to 1999. This may may reﬂect
a growing awareness of personal responsibility for health insurance matters.
Yet, we cannot rule out that the pronounced increase from 1998 to 1999 repre-
sents an artefact of framing the GSOEP questionnaire. The questions concerning
the health insurance status were substantially rephrased in 1999 addressing the is-
sue of supplementary health insurance in a more straightforward way. In fact, the
association of private health insurers does not report a signiﬁcant increase in the
number of supplementary contracts form 1998 to 1999 (PKV, 2001). Yet, reliable
aggregate ﬁgures about the number of insured holding a private supplementary in-
surance are not available (PKV, 2001). However, since both treatment and control
group are equally affected by the change in the GSEOP questionnaire we assume
that in the suggested difference-in-differences approach any questionnaire-effects
cancel out.
4 The Empirical Model





it = δ0Di + δ1(Q97
t × Di)+δ2(Q99
t × Di)+θ Zt + β Xit + εit. (1)
The subscripts i and t indicate individuals and periods, respectively. Di represents a
dummy-variable indicating that an individual belongs to the treatment group. The
indicator Q97
t takes the value one for all periods t ≥ 1997 and zero otherwise. Q99
t
takes the value one if t ≥ 1999 holds and zero otherwise. Zt represents a vector of
yearly dummies indicating the current period, while Xit represents a vector of con-
trol variables. Finally εit is a random error term. The vectors of coefﬁcients δ, θ, and
10β are subject to estimation. Our focus is on δ1 and δ2. The former captures the effects
of excluding dentures from the beneﬁt package on the demand for supplementary
health insurance, while the latter captures the effect of re-including them.11 In or-
der to identify the effects δ1 and δ2 we have to assume that any unobserved time
varying determinants of the demand for supplementary insurance other than the
analyzed change in the legal environment are captured by the time ﬁxed-effects θ.
That is, we rule out that any of these determinants exhibits heterogeneous effects
on the control and the treatment group; cf. AUGURZKY ET AL. (2006) for a similar
approach.
When estimating the model, we impose the restriction δ2 = −δ1 on the treatment
effects. That is, we assume that abolishing the reform of 1997 exactly cancels out the
effect the reform might have had on the demand for supplementary private health
insurance. This is done for technical reasons. Prior to the year 1997, we observe just
a single individual holding a supplementary health insurance who belongs to the
treatment group.12 Thus in standard binary choice models, the identiﬁcation of δ1
would rest on this single observation alone if no restrictions were imposed on the
coefﬁcients.
Besides the constant term, the vector of control variables Xit includes, age, net-
personal equivalent income, current health status (good, satisfactory, poor), and
school-leaving degree (secondary or lower, intermediate, technical/upper secon-
dary). The current labor market status is captured by two indicators: one for being
currently in education and one for being employed except for apprenticeship. In
addition, indicators for being female, having German citizenship, being unmarried,
11In parametric binary choice models (Logit, Probit, etc.) one has to scale the estimated coefﬁcient
by the value of the probability density function f(·) at some point of reference, in order to obtain
marginal effects on the probability Pr(Yit = 1).
12The sampling weight for this particular individual is rather high. Thus Table 1 seemingly indi-
cates a much larger number of observations.
11having completed vocational education, and living in east Germany are included.
The basic model is estimated using a standard Logit model pooling all observa-
tions from the panel waves 1995 to 2000. As a robustness check, we also try the
Probit, the Complementary Log-Log, and the Linear Probability (LP) model. The
coefﬁcients of primary interest, i.e. δ1 and δ2, do not represent parameters in terms
of a structural parametric model. They rather have to interpreted in terms of aver-
age treatment effects. Hence, we take the sampling weights into account and report
results from weighted regressions; cf. CAMERON &T RIVEDI (2005).
In addition to the basic speciﬁcation, we estimate model variants that pair-wise
compareone individualyearwhenthe reformwasineffect –i.e.eitherthe year1997
or the year 1998 – and the post-abolishment year 2000. Here, equation (1) reduces
to
Y∗
it = δ0Di + δ2(Q99
t × Di)+θ  Zt + β Xit + εit. (2)
In equation (2)  Zt consists of a single period-indicator. For pair-wise comparing
years we have to focus on the re-including of dentures in 1999. Due to the small
treatment group for the pre-1997 waves the cutback in beneﬁts in 1997 cannot sepa-
rately be analyzed. We also estimate equation (2) by Logit, Probit, the Complemen-
tary Log-Log, and LP.
Finally, weapplylinearandLogitﬁxed-effects(FE)estimatorsinordertoaccount
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. For the ﬁxed-effect estimators, equation
(1) has to be augmented by αi, i.e. time-invariant individual intercepts.
Y∗
it = αi + δ1(Q97
t × Di)+δ2(Q99
t × Di)+θ Zt + β   Xit + εit. (3)
In FE models only time varying characteristics may enter  Xit. Analogously, a lin-
ear age effect is not identiﬁed if yearly dummies are included, i.e. the variable age
12can not enter  Xit either. The reason for this is that the absolute age level – that
separates age effects from time effects – is already absorbed by the the individ-
ual effects. Moreover, the conditional ﬁxed-effects Logit estimator (CHAMBERLAIN,
1980), which is used in this analysis, only uses the information of those individuals
that have changed their status concerning the dependent variable. The restriction
δ2 = −δ1 is imposed on the FE speciﬁcations too, though for theses models the
identiﬁcation of δ1 is somewhat stronger than in the pooled models.
5 Results
Table 2 displays the estimated marginal effects for two variants of the pooled Logit
model. The ﬁrst variant includes the the full set of explanatory variables. The sec-
ond one excludes socioeconomic variables that are clearly insigniﬁcant.13 These are
German citizenship, being currently in education, having completed vocational ed-
ucation, being unmarried and current health. With respect to the signiﬁcant control
variables, estimation results indicate that females are more likely to hold a sup-
plementary insurance than males. Being employed and being in education have
positive effects too. Jointly, the level of educational attainment has a signiﬁcant ef-
fect. Finally, the probability of holding a private supplementary insurance increases
with personal income.
Yet, most importantly, the treatment effect turns out to be insigniﬁcant for both
model variants, even at the 10%-level. This also holds for the model that only com-
pares two years and the ﬁxed-effects models as well; see Tables 3 and 4. Moreover,
the Probit as well as the Complementary Log-Log speciﬁcation mirror the results
for the Logit model. For the Linear Probability model, results are less akin. Yet,
13A stepwise regression technique using backward selection an the 0.1-signiﬁcance level for re-
moval is used to determine the preferred small model.
13Table 2: Marginal Effects for Pooled Logit Regressions
Full Model Small Model
parameter/variable Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
δ2f(·)=−δ1f(·) 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.011
δ0f(·) -0.013 0.007 -0.013 0.008
year 1996 -0.001 0.010 -0.003 0.010
year 1997 -0.005 0.009 -0.007 0.009
year 1998 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.012
year 1999 0.064* 0.028 0.060* 0.028
year 2000 0.051* 0.020 0.048* 0.019
age -0.004 0.002 -0.004* 0.002
female 0.018* 0.006 0.018* 0.006
east -0.007 0.004 – –
German citizenship 0.016 0.010 – –
employed 0.024* 0.008 0.023* 0.008
in education 0.018* 0.008 0.023* 0.009
completed vocational education -0.013 0.008 – –
never married -0.006 0.017 – –
income 0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.000
satisfactory health 0.011 0.007 – –
poor health 0.001 0.010 – –
intermediate school -0.010 0.005 -0.011 0.006
upper secondary/technical school 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008
number of observations 6337 6337
log-likelihood -924.2 -936.0
joint signiﬁcance (P-value) 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors reported. * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.05-level.
Marginal effects calculated at the means of independent variables.
Observations weighted by inverse sampling probability.
even in this case we do not obtain a signiﬁcant and negative estimate for δ2.
In essence, our results do not indicate any strong and signiﬁcant effect of the
exclusion and re-inclusion of dentures from the statutory beneﬁt package on the
demand for supplementary private health insurance. Thus, we cannot rule out that
clients are in fact not capable of making informed choices about the coverage of
theirhealthinsurance and, therefore, arewelloffwitha comprehensivecompulsory
beneﬁt package. However, interpreting the results in such a distinct way seems not
to be justiﬁed for the following reasons.
14Table 3: Marginal Effects for Two-Years Pooled Logit Regressions
2000 vs. 1998 2000 vs. 1997
parameter/variable Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
δ2f(·) 0.010 0.021 -0.001 0.018
δ0f(·) 0.003 0.021 0.013 0.022
year 2000 0.018 0.011 0.028* 0.012
age 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003
female 0.024* 0.008 0.014 0.007
east -0.013* 0.006 -0.004 0.006
German citizenship 0.032* 0.006 0.024* 0.007
completed vocational education -0.020* 0.009 -0.011 0.008
income 0.002* 0.001 0.001* 0.000
in education -0.002 0.008 0.001 0.008
intermediate school -0.003 0.009 0.007 0.009
upper secondary/technical school 0.011 0.012 0.026 0.015
number of observations 2517 2523
log-likelihood -412.5 -377.9
joint signiﬁcance (P-value) 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors reported. * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.05-level.
Marginal effects calculated at the means of independent variables.
Observations weighted by inverse sampling probability.
First, in our sample the treatment group is rather small. Hence, estimation of
treatment effects rests on only a few observations leading to imprecise estimation
results and large standard errors. Moreover, other limitations of data discussed in
section 3 are likely to add additional noise to the data making the detection of treat-
ment effects even more awkward. Second, to a minor degree even the control group
has been affected by the analyzed change in law. This might result in estimates of
the treatment effects that are biased towards zero. Third, the analyzed reform has
been in force for only two years. Yet, it is well known from other studies concerned
with the German health insurance market that clients do adjust rather slowly to
exogenous shocks, cf. TA M ME TA L . (2007). That is, many individuals belonging to
the treatment group might have considered or even planned buying supplemen-
tary health insurance because of the reform of 1997. Yet, the reforms might have
been abolished so quickly that these plans were never implemented. Moreover,
15Table 4: Coefﬁcients for Fixed-Effects Regressions
Chamberlain’s FE-Logit Linear Probability
parameter/variable Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
δ2 = −δ1 0.494 0.933 0.000 0.012
year 1996 0.245 0.618 -0.003 0.007
year 1997 0.150 0.644 -0.005 0.007
year 1998 0.085 0.683 -0.009 0.008
year 1999 2.420* 0.708 0.042* 0.009
year 2000 2.372* 0.794 0.036* 0.011
east 0.382 0.578 0.010 0.008
employed 0.277 0.584 0.004 0.009
completed vocational education 0.721 0.644 0.021* 0.010
income -0.042 0.042 -0.002* 0.001
intermediate school -1.471 0.762 -0.035* 0.015
upper secondary/technical school -3.798* 1.009 -0.092* 0.021
number of observations 343 6749
log-likelihood -81.3 –
joint signiﬁcance (P-value) 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors reported. * indicate signiﬁcance at the 0.05-level.
the change from a 40% co-payment to full self-pay treatment might not have been
strong enough to trigger effects that are easily identiﬁed in the data; cf. BAUER ET
AL. (2007) for a similar case. Forth, our focus is exclusively on very young individu-
als. Yet, people from this age group are probably less likely covered by supplemen-
tary health insurance and may not be representative for the entire population. That
is, we cannot rule out that reforms similar to the one analyzed here might exhibit
more substantial effects for other age groups. Finally, in the late 1990s freedom of
choice and personal responsibility were rather novel concepts to the German statu-
tory health insurance scheme. Actually, free choice of the insurance provider has
been introduced just in 1996. Thus, at this time many clients might in fact have not
been in a position to rationally decide about the coverage their health insurance.
Yet, after ten years of free choice, things might have changed and nowadays one
might expect much stronger effects of changes in the beneﬁt package than those we
observe in data from the late 1990s.
166 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the exclusion of dentures from – and the subse-
quent re-inclusion to – the compulsory beneﬁt package of the German statutory
health insurance scheme. Our focus is on the effects on the demand for supplemen-
tary private health insurance. The empirical analysis, which uses a difference-in-
differences approach and is based on individual level date from the GSOEP, does
not show any signiﬁcant effects. This holds for a wide range of different model
speciﬁcations. Thus, our results do not support the hypothesis that clients do make
informed choices about theirs health insurances’ coverage and, therefore, would be
better off if more freedom of choice were introduced to the German statutory health
insurance scheme.
Yet, our results does not clearly reject this hypothesis either. That is, the analyzed
reform might have had effects on the demand for supplementary private insurance
but we did not detect them because of insufﬁcient data. The rather small treatment
group – apparently, the reform has intentionally been designed not to affect many
clients immediately – that exclusively consists of very young individuals as well as
the immediate abolishment of the analyzed beneﬁt cut gives some support to this
interpretation. Hence, more research in the effects of beneﬁt cutbacks is required in
order to answer the question of whether introducing more freedom of choice to of
the statutory health insurance scheme will be beneﬁcial.
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